A new US administration is always a global-level event. The world anticipated George W. Bush’s arrival at the White House with fears that came to be confirmed, while Barack Obama’s election brought hopes that didn’t pay off. But for perhaps the first time ever, the new boss of the Oval Office is seen with perplexity and confusion. No one quite knows what to expect of Donald Trump’s presidency. That’s rather natural, because he doesn’t seem to know what to expect himself.
This eccentric elderly billionaire comes back to power with a set of populist slogans that sound threatening enough to scare American liberals but give absolutely no clue as to the priorities and strategies of Trump’s foreign policy. Yes, Trump intends to fight an influx of immigrants from Latin America, as well as Chinese and other international competition in the domestic and global markets. He has begun legislating on these fronts and others. But these priorities are not enough to build upon and strengthen the US’s global hegemon and superpower status.
Trump’s election came along with a unique ideological crisis, in which all the usual principles that American politics was based on are put in question. For decades, a bipartisan consensus in Washington regarding basic values and priorities of foreign policy dominated. Arguments did take place, often heated, but they regarded tactical questions rather than strategic ones. Strategic principles that successive administrations followed regarding Europe, the Soviet Union, Russia, Latin America, the Middle East, and elsewhere were perceived as a reflection of national interests. Not only the governing elite, but also most of American society shared this vision.
The Left was the exception. It harshly criticized American involvement in any part of the world. But it criticized US policy from its victims’ point of view, from the outside, and didn’t offer its own alternative vision of national interests, nor a…
Auteur: Boris Kagarlitsky
