Something is stirring on the European Union’s eastern flank. Hungary is increasingly throwing its lot in with China and receiving billions in investment in return. Slovakia under Prime Minister Robert Fico keeps breaking with Brussels on Ukraine and edging closer to Moscow. Even in countries still aligned with Brussels — like Poland and Romania — illiberal contenders with Euroskeptic platforms are within striking distance of power. Across Central and Eastern Europe, it is becoming clear that Brussels is no longer the only game in town.
Beneath the political noise lies a rational calculus. The global economy is fragmenting thanks to increasingly unstable supply chains, disruptive new technologies, and mounting geopolitical rivalries. In response, Brussels is pivoting toward domestic capacities and strategic sectors. Smaller Central and Eastern European states are ill-equipped to adapt and benefit from that shift, as they remain dependent on external demand and foreign capital. Faced with a strategic agenda focused on industrial sovereignty, green investment, and reduced dependencies on China, which they are poorly positioned to join, some of these states are hedging by seeking external capital and partnerships that keep their old model alive. The result is a slow erosion of Europe’s internal coherence.
These regional dynamics are part of a much bigger story. The globalization of the 1990s now seems like a thing of the past. Call it “de-globalization,” “geoeconomic fragmentation,” or something else, but protectionism and geopolitical…
Auteur: Jan Boguslawski
