The Leninist theory of imperialism rests on the idea that surplus capital in the imperial core must be exported abroad in order to remain profitable. Lenin identifies four core features of imperialism, but capital export is central: the replacement of commodity export with capital export is, for him, the defining shift.
Trump may have assumed that large oil conglomerates would be eager to export capital under these conditions, but in practice they have been highly reluctant to do so. In the classic Leninist model, monopoly or finance capital — understood as the fusion of large industry and banking — seeks out profitable opportunities for overseas investment. That dynamic does not seem to apply here.
Contemporary financialized capital, as distinct from the finance capital Lenin described, is deeply averse to investment in fixed capital. It prefers to remain liquid. Most oil companies today are not inclined toward large-scale production investments; they prefer to hoard cash and limit exposure. There are also internal tensions within the industry: the United States is now a major oil producer, and domestic producers have little incentive to finance projects that would undercut their own prices. Asking US oil interests to invest capital in Venezuela in order to depress global prices is, from their perspective, an irrational proposition.
What may be more illuminating is what I’ve half-jokingly called “dingbat imperialism.” This refers to a layer of smaller, more speculative firms — which are often politically connected within the administration — that lack the corporate structures and public-market exposure of the major conglomerates. These smaller firms are drawn to short-term, high-risk ventures: foreign adventures that promise rapid gains rather than slow, long-term accumulation. They appear more willing to take on the role Lenin assigned to finance capital in his reading of imperialism.
Rosa Luxemburg may also be relevant here, because her…
Auteur: John Ganz
