During the second half of the 1980s, Oxfam ran an extensive food aid program among Beja nomads in Sudan’s arid Red Sea Hills. The Beja had lost around half of their cattle and sheep during the severe drought of 1984. Based on extensive household and nutritional surveillance, Oxfam operated what was claimed to be a humanitarian “food for recovery” program. Using targeted food assistance, it promised, future stress sales of livestock could be prevented, thus helping the Beja to recover their herds.
Sometime in 1987, as Oxfam’s country representative for Sudan, I was in the wrap-up session of a periodic visit to its Port Sudan office. The humid sea air did nothing to reduce the oppressive afternoon heat. Having gone through day-to-day organizational issues with the team, the closing conversation took an unscripted turn.
Doubtless informed by growing knowledge of conditions in the Red Sea Hills and the regional government’s attitude, the question of what Oxfam was “actually doing” speculatively bubbled to the surface. While the “food for recovery” idea made a strong public case for donor support, there was a suspicion that there was more to it than that.
The government had done little to nothing to help the Beja. There were no rural services, appropriate provision, or even meaningful concern. The Beja were a neglected, second-class citizenry and there was no sign that this would improve soon. Previously unarticulated, at least collectively, the team formed the opinion that Oxfam was not only replacing an absent government but going further. While satisfying external sponsors, the claim to be supporting herd recovery also served to downplay legitimate Beja concerns, while also moving the government out of the spotlight….
Auteur: Mark Duffield
